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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to provide a logical framework for the
specification of autonomous Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). A MAS
is autonomous in so far as it is capable of binding (‘nomos’) itself
(‘auto’) independently of any external normative constraint speci-
fied by a designer. In particular, a MAS is autonomous if it is able
to maintain its social institutions (i.e. rule-governed social prac-
tices) only by way of the agents’ attitudes. In order to specify an
autonomous MAS, we propose the logic AL (Acceptance Logic)
in which the acceptance of a proposition by the agents qua group
members (i.e. group acceptance) is introduced. Such propositions
are true w.r.t. an institutional context and correspond to facts that
are instituted in an attitude-dependent way (i.e. normative and insti-
tutional facts). Finally, we contend that the present approach paves
the way for a foundation of legal institutions, for studying the in-
teraction between social and legal institutions and, eventually, for
understanding and modeling institutional change.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.4 [Knowledge Representation Formalisms and Methods]:
Modal logic; I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Intelli-
gent agents; I.2.0 [General]: Philosophical foundations.
General Terms
Theory.
Keywords
Normative systems, logics for agent systems, modal logic.
1. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous agents that interact with each other (and with hu-
man beings) pose at least two general problems: they should be
able to achieve some level of coordination in order to accomplish
their distributed tasks and, notwithstanding their autonomy and
self-interest, they should be somehow influenceable towards the
fulfillment of some collective goal. One possible way to tackle
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these problems is to devise artificial institutions ([23, 9]). Follow-
ing the classical work of Douglass North artificial institutions are
usually conceived as human-like: “the rules of the game in a soci-
ety or the humanly devised constraints that structure agents’ inter-
action” ([24, p. 3]). With this model in mind, AI practitioners have
interpreted their task as that of advancing logical or computational
frameworks to represent institutions, while leaving to the agents’
autonomy the decision whether to comply or not with the specified
rules ([1, 8]). This approach, however, has at least three strong lim-
itations. First of all, the institutions are not only constraints but also
‘enablements’ ([26]): new possibilities of actions (i.e. institutional
actions like paying, marrying, promising etc.) are possible when
an institution is in place. Secondly, artificial institutions are usu-
ally inspired by human legal ones which, however, are only a small
part of the institutionalized human interactions. Moreover, to work
effectively, legal institutions should interact with informal ones.1
Finally, and more importantly, institutions should be constructed
by the agents themselves and not imposed from the outside.
More precisely, while it is a widely shared that, in order to face
complex and dynamical problems, the individual agents must be
autonomous, less emphasis is devoted to the fact that the multi-
agent systems (MAS) themselves (for exactly the same reasons)
should be conceived and designed to be autonomous. In fact, ety-
mologically, autonomous means self-binding (‘auto’ and ‘nomos’),
and an autonomous MAS is the vision of an artificial society that is
able to create, maintain, and eventually change its own institutions
by itself, without the intervention of the external designer in this
process.
This challenge is also strongly tied to the new trend of designing
self-organizing MASs but, in contrast to many efforts in the area,
we are after a notion of self-organization that is amenable for, and
can make profit of, more complex cognitive agents (i.e. BDI-like;
see [7] for the general approach). In fact, quoting North again [21,
p. 77]:
“Only because institutions are anchored in peoples
minds do they ever become behaviorally relevant. The
elucidation of the internal aspect is the crucial step in
adequately explaining the emergence, evolution, and
effects of institutions (emphasis added).”
In this paper, we aim to provide a logical framework for the spec-
ification of autonomous MASs, that is, MASs whose agents are ca-
1Following [24], we consider informal such institutions as social
norms and social practices (i.e. promise). In his seminal book North
explicitly states the relevance of this informal layer but still this
component is widely neglected in the MAS literature. On the im-
portance of informal normative relations in social contexts see [5].
pable of creating and maintaining their institutions by themselves
(Section 3). The focus of this contribution is on modeling social or
informal institutions, rather than legal ones. Social institutions are
the basic structures of a society on top of which more complex legal
ones are constructed. By social or informal institutions, we refer to
rule-governed social practices in which no member with ‘special’
powers is introduced.2 More specifically, we will introduce the no-
tion of an agent’s acceptance of a proposition qua group member in
a given institutional context (Section 2), and we will study its inter-
action with different notions such that of common belief and private
belief (Section 4). On the basis of these attitudes qua group mem-
bers, we will specify how a group can create and maintain norma-
tive and institutional facts which hold only in an attitude-dependent
way. That is, it is up to the agents, and not to the external designer,
to support such facts (Section 5). We will compare our proposal
with related logical works on the issues of collective belief and in-
stitutions (Section 6). In conclusion we will identify directions for
future work on the basis of our framework (Section 7). Anchoring
institutions, and their facts, in agents’ minds is just the first step to-
wards a more complete characterization of the “internal aspect” of
normative systems and towards the vision of autonomous MASs.
2. ACCEPTANCE QUA GROUP MEMBER
Although in this paper the notion of acceptance qua group mem-
ber is a primitive (i.e. it is not analyzed in more specific mental
attitudes), some conceptual clarification is needed because of the
crucial role it plays in explaining the maintenance of social institu-
tions. Whereas beliefs have been studied for decades [16] as rep-
resentative of doxastic mental states, acceptances have only been
examined since [27] and [6] while studying the nature of argument
premises or reformulating Moore’s paradox [6]. If a belief that p is
an attitude constitutively aimed at the truth of p, an acceptance is
the output of “a decision to treat p as true in one’s utterances and ac-
tions” [15] without being necessarily connected to the actual truth
of the proposition. In order to better specify this distinction, it has
been suggested [15] that while beliefs are not subject to the agent’s
will, acceptances are voluntary; while beliefs aim at truth, accep-
tance are sensitive to pragmatic considerations; while beliefs are
shaped by evidence, acceptances need not be; while beliefs come
in degrees, acceptances are qualitative; finally, while beliefs are
context-independent, acceptance depends on context.
For the aims of this paper we are particularly interested in the last
feature, namely the fact that acceptances can be context-dependent.
In fact, one can decide (say for prudential reasons) to reason and
act by “accepting" the truth of a proposition in a specific context,
and possibly rejecting the very same proposition in a different one.
Although, usually, this aspect of the acceptance state is studied in
private contexts (i.e. when an agent, in order not to take too many
risks, accepts that the total cost of her house restructuring will be
beyond her reasonable expectations; see [4]), we will explore the
role of this attitude in institutional contexts. Institutional contexts
are rule-governed social practices on the background of which the
agents reason. For example, take the case of a game like Clue. The
institutional context is the rule-governed social practice which the
agents conform to in order to be competent players.
On the background of such contexts, we are interested in the ex-
plicit mental states (the acceptances) that can be formally captured.
In the context of Clue, for instance, an agent accepts that some-
thing has happened (see Example 3) qua player of Clue. The state
2It is in fact specific to legal institutions to have specialized agents
empowered to change the institution itself on behalf of everybody
else (see Section 5.1).
of acceptance qua group member in an institutional context is the
kind of acceptance one is committed to when one is “functioning
as a group member" [29]. Although space restrictions prevent a full
analysis of this notion, it is important to stress that we consider this
attitude as one that is held by an agent. Nevertheless, there are spe-
cific consequences deriving from the agent’s functioning as a group
member: e.g. the acceptance of a proposition qua group member is
always a public fact (see Section 4.1).
3. THE LOGIC OF ACCEPTANCE
3.1 Syntax
The syntactic primitives of our logicAL (Acceptance Logic) are
the following: – a finite set of n > 0 agents AGT = {1, 2, ..., n};
– a nonempty finite set of atomic actionsACT = {a, b, ...}; – a set
of atomic formulas ATM = {p, q, ...}; – a finite set of labels de-
noting institutional contexts INST = {inst1, inst2, ..., instm};
– a symbol λ denoting the private context. For notational conve-
nience we note 2AGT⋆ = 2AGT \ {∅} the set of all non empty
subsets of agents, ∆1 =
{
C:x|C ∈ 2AGT⋆, x ∈ INST
}
the set of
all couples of non empty subsets of agents and institutional con-
texts, ∆2 = {i:λ|i ∈ AGT} the set of all couples of single agents
and private context, and i:x for {i} :x. Finally, ∆ = ∆1 ∪∆2.
The language LAL is defined as the smallest superset of ATM
such that: if ϕ,ψ ∈ LAL, i ∈ AGT and C:x ∈ ∆ then ¬ϕ, ϕ∨ψ
and [C:x]ϕ ∈ LAL. The classical boolean connectives ∧, →, ↔,
⊤ (tautology) and ⊥ (contradiction) are defined from ∨ and ¬ in
the usual manner.
Formula [C:x]ϕ has to be read “the agents in C accept that ϕ
while functioning as group members in the institutional context x”.
EXAMPLE 1. [C:Greenpeace] protectEarth is read “the agents
in C accept that the mission of Greenpeace is to protect the Earth
while functioning as activists in the context of Greenpeace” and
[i:Catholic]PopeInfallibility is read “the agent i accepts that the
Pope is infallible while functioning as a Catholic in the context of
the Catholic Church”.
For C:x ∈ ∆1 : [C:x]⊥ has to be read “agents in C are not
functioning as group members in the institutional context x” be-
cause we assume that functioning as a group member is, at least in
this minimal sense, a rational activity; conversely, ¬ [C:x]⊥ has
to be read “agents in C are functioning as group members in the
institutional context x”; ¬ [C:x]⊥ ∧ [C:x]ϕ stands for “agents in
C are functioning as group members in the context x and they ac-
cept that ϕwhile functioning as group members” or simply “agents
in C accept that ϕ qua group members in the institutional context
x” which, for us, is tantamount to “The group C accepts that ϕ in
the institutional context x” (i.e. group acceptance). Similarly, the
formula ¬ [C:x]ϕ has to be read “agents in C are functioning as
group members in the institutional context x and they do not accept
that ϕ while functioning as group members in x” or simply “agents
inC do not accept that ϕ qua group members in x” (i.e. “The group
C does not accept that ϕ in the institutional context x).
EXAMPLE 2. ¬ [{i, j} :Europe]⊥ ∧ [{i, j} :Europe]EuroMea-
nsOfExchange stands for “i and j accept qua Europeans that the
Euro is the official means of exchange in the context of Europe”,
whereas ¬ [{i, j} :Europe]DollarMeansOfExchange stands for
“i and j qua Europeans do not accept that dollar is the official
means of exchange”.
Modal operators of the form [i:λ] correspond to standard dox-
astic operators.3 Hence a formula [i:λ]ϕ has to be read “agent i
believes that ϕ”.
3.2 Semantics
We use a standard possible worlds semantics and a model is a
triple M = 〈W,A ,V 〉 where:
• W is a set of possible worlds;
• A : ∆ −→ (W −→ 2W ) associates each C:x ∈ ∆ and
possible world w with the set AC:x(w) of possible worlds
accepted by the group C in w, where agents in C are func-
tioning as group members in the institutional context x;
• V : W −→ 2ATM is a truth assignment which associates
each world w with the set V (w) of atomic propositions true
in w.
The rules defining the truth conditions of formulas of our logic
are inductively defined as follows.
• M, w |= p iff p ∈ V (w);
• M, w |= ¬ϕ iff not M, w |= ϕ;
• M, w |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ or M, w |= ψ;
• M, w |= [C:x]ϕ iff for all w′ ∈ W , if w′ ∈ AC:x(w)
then M, w′ |= ϕ.
3.3 Axiomatization
The axiom system of LAL is made of all tautologies of proposi-
tional calculus and, the axioms and rules of inference of the basic
normal modal logic for every operator [C:x] where C:x ∈ ∆. That
is, we have all K-theorems for every C:x ∈ ∆.
Moreover, we suppose that given a set of agents C, all B ⊆ C
have access to all the facts that are accepted (or that are not ac-
cepted) by agents in C while functioning as group members in the
institutional context x. In particular, we suppose the following re-
lations between the acceptances of the group members with respect
to the institutional contexts: if agents in C (do not) accept that ϕ
while functioning as group members in the institutional context x
then for every subsetB ofC and institutional context y while func-
tioning as group members in the institutional context y, agents in
B accept that agents in C (do not) accept that ϕ while functioning
as group members in the institutional context x. Furthermore, we
suppose the following relations between the acceptance qua group
member and individual beliefs: if agents in C (do not) accept that
ϕ while functioning as group members in the institutional context
x then, for every agent i in C, we have that i believes that agents
in C (do not) accept that ϕ while functioning as group members
in the institutional context x. Finally we suppose standard proper-
ties of introspection for beliefs: if agent i believes that ϕ then he
believes that he believes that ϕ; if agent i does not believe that ϕ
then he believes that he does not believe that ϕ. Such properties are
captured by the following two axiom schemas. For every C:x, B:y
∈ ∆, if B ⊆ C then:
[C:x]ϕ→ [B:y] [C:x]ϕ4[C :x],[B:y]
¬ [C:x]ϕ→ [B:y]¬ [C:x]ϕ5[C :x],[B:y]
3For the sake of compactness we prefer to adopt this non-standard
notation for doxastic operators.
Axioms 4[C :x],[B:y] and 5[C :x],[B:y] together correspond to the
following semantic property of Kripke models. For every w ∈ W
and C:x, B:y ∈ ∆, if B ⊆ C then:
S1 if w′ ∈ AB:y(w) then AC:x(w′) = AC:x(w)
We also suppose that if agents in C accept that ϕ qua group
members in the institutional context x then, for every subset B of
C, it holds that agents in B accept ϕ qua group members in the in-
stitutional context x. This means that things accepted by the agents
in a set C (qua group members) with respect to a certain institu-
tional context x are also accepted by agents in all C’s subsets with
respect to the same context x. Formally, for every C:x, B:x ∈ ∆,
if B ⊆ C then:
Inc[C :x],[B:x] ¬ [C:x]⊥ ∧ [C:x]ϕ→ ¬ [B:x]⊥ ∧ [B:x]ϕ
EXAMPLE 3. Imagine three agents i, j, k that,qua players accept,
in the context of Clue, that someone called Mrs. Red, has been
killed: ¬ [{i, j, k} :Clue]⊥∧ [{i, j, k} :Clue] killedMrsRed . This
implies that also the two agents i, j qua Clue players accept that
someone called Mrs. Red has been killed in that context:
¬ [{i, j} :Clue]⊥ ∧ [{i, j} :Clue] killedMrsRed .
Axiom Inc[C :x],[B:x] has the following semantic characteriza-
tion. For every w ∈W , C:x, B:x ∈ ∆, if B ⊆ C then:
if AC:x(w) 6= ∅ then AB:x(w) 6= ∅
and AB:x(w) ⊆ AC:x(w)
S2
As far as operators of type [i:λ] for beliefs are concerned, we
suppose that an agent cannot believe contradictions. Formally, for
every i:λ ∈ ∆2:
D[i:λ] ¬([i:λ]ϕ ∧ [i:λ]¬ϕ)
which corresponds to the following standard property of seriality.
For every w ∈W and i:λ ∈ ∆2 we have:
S3 Ai:λ(w) 6= ∅
Thus, every doxastic operator [i:λ] is KD45 . (Indeed, besides sat-
isfying Axiom D, it also satisfies Axioms 4 and 5 as particular in-
stances of Axioms 4[C :x],[B:y] and 5[C :x],[B:y] where C = B =
{i} and x = y = λ.)
We call AL (Acceptance Logic) the logic axiomatized by the
four principles 4[C :x],[B:y], 5[C :x],[B:y], Inc[C :x],[B:x], D[i:λ]
and we write ⊢AL ϕ iff formula ϕ is a theorem of AL. Moreover,
let M be a model such that M = 〈W,A,V 〉 as defined in Section
3.2 and satisfying the semantic constraints S1–S3 given above. We
write |=AL ϕ iff formula ϕ is valid in allALmodels, i.e.M, w |=
ϕ for every AL model M and world w in M. Finally, we say that
a formula ϕ is satisfiable if there exists an AL model M and a
world w in M such that M, w |= ϕ.
4. GROUP ACCEPTANCE PROPERTIES
4.1 The public nature of group acceptance
In Section 3.1, we have analyzed the notion of group accep-
tance as the set of the acceptances of all the agents in the group
while functioning as group members. This notion of acceptance
qua group member however must not be confused with (nor re-
duced to) that of a private mental attitude. On the contrary we
claim that group acceptances are always public so much that it is
part of the concept of functioning as a group member that all the
agents commonly believe that one is functioning in this way. In
MAS literature, an operator to express common belief is given (see
for instance [10]). The notion of common belief can be built on the
concept of individual belief and on a particular kind of distributed
belief of the form “every agent in C believes that ϕ”. The former
concept is expressed in our logic by operators of type [i:λ]. The
latter concept is formally expressed by operators of type EC where
a formula ECϕ is defined as follows:
ECϕ
def
=
∧
i∈C
[i:λ]ϕ
Given a set of agents C ⊆ AGT , formula CBCϕ is meant to
stand for “there is common belief in C that ϕ”, that is, “everyone
in C believes that ϕ, everyone in C believes that everyone in C
believes that ϕ, everyone in C believes that everyone in C believes
that everyone in C believes that ϕ, and so on”. If E1Cϕ denotes
ECϕ and EkCϕ denotes EC(Ek−1C ϕ), we can define CBCϕ as
follows:
CBCϕ
def
=
∧
k>0
E
k
Cϕ
With the aim of making the public nature of group acceptance ex-
plicit, the following theorem highlights the relationship between
our notion of group acceptance (i.e. acceptance by each of the
agents qua group members) expressed by operator of type [C:x]
and the concept of common belief.
THEOREM. For any C:x ∈ ∆:
(1) ⊢AL [C:x]ϕ↔ CBC [C:x]ϕ
PROOF. Direction → can be proved from proving that ∀k > 0,
[C:x]ϕ→ EkC [C:x]ϕ by induction on k:
• [C:x]ϕ→ EC [C:x]ϕ (case k = 1)
• From [C:x]ϕ→ EkC [C:x]ϕ infer
[C:x]ϕ→ Ek+1C [C:x]ϕ (inductive case)
To prove the case k = 1, we just apply Axiom 4[C :x],[B:y] with
B:y = i:λ for each i ∈ C, which implies that [C:x]→
∧
i∈C [i:λ]
[C:x]ϕ. The latter is the case k = 1 by definition of EC .
Let us prove the inductive case. We suppose that [C:x]ϕ →
EkC [C:x]ϕ. By rule of necessitation on every [i:λ], we infer∧
i∈C [i:λ] ([C:x]ϕ → E
k
C [C:x]ϕ) which is (by definition of
EC ) equivalent to: EC([C:x]ϕ → EkC [C:x]ϕ). Thus from
the latter, case k = 1 and definition of Ek+1C we can deduce
that [C:x]ϕ → Ek+1C [C:x]ϕ. This is enough to prove that
[C:x]ϕ → EkC [C:x]ϕ (for k > 0) is a theorem. We can
thus infer that
∧
k>0
([C:x]ϕ → EkC [C:x]ϕ) holds. By stan-
dard modal principles,
∧
k>0
([C:x]ϕ → EkC [C:x]ϕ) implies
[C:x]ϕ →
∧
k>0
EkC [C:x]ϕ which is equivalent to [C:x]ϕ →
CBC [C:x]ϕ. We leave to the reader the proof of ← direction of
the theorem. 2
According to Theorem 1, the agents in C accept that ϕ while
functioning as group members in the institutional context x if and
only if there is common belief in C that they accept that ϕ while
functioning as group members in the institutional context x. Hence,
accepting a proposition while functioning as a group member is
always a public fact which is out in the open and that is used by all
the members to reason about each other in an institutional context.
4.2 Group acceptance and individual beliefs
As far as the relationship between acceptances qua group mem-
bers and individual beliefs is concerned, it has to be noted that
¬ [C:x]⊥ ∧ [C:x]ϕ ∧
∧
i∈C [i:λ]¬ϕ where C:x ∈ ∆1 is satis-
fiable in our logic. This means that the attitudes privately endorsed
by the agents and those entertained qua group members can di-
verge: one can privately disbelieve that which is accepted while
functioning as a group member.
EXAMPLE 4. Consider the discursive dilemma as elaborated in
[25] in which a three-member court has to make a judgment on
whether a defendant is liable for a breach of contract. If one as-
sumes that the group accepts the majority rule to decide on the
issue, it might happen that each judge can privately believe that the
group ought to accept a certain conclusion (e.g. that the defendant
is liable), while each is forced to accept the opposite qua group
member ( i.e. qua judge).
5. ATTITUDE-DEPENDENT FACTS
Normative and institutional facts are a class of facts that are typ-
ical of institutional contexts [26]. Such facts have the peculiar fea-
ture of being dependent on the agents’ attitudes in a way that we
are now in the position to specify in detail. More precisely it has
been noted that these facts are characterized at least by two features
[19, 26, 28].
• Performativity: an attitude of certain type shared by a group
of agents towards a normative or an institutional fact may
contribute to the truth of a sentence describing the fact.
• Reflexivity: if a sentence describing a normative or an insti-
tutional fact is true, the relevant attitude is present.
EXAMPLE 5. If the agents qua group members accept that a certain
piece of paper as money (an institutional fact), then, in the appro-
priate context, this piece of paper is money for that group (perfor-
mativity). At the same time, if it is true that a certain piece of paper
is money for a group, then the agents qua group members accept
the piece of paper as money (reflexivity).
In order to represent in AL these kind of facts, we need first to
define the concept of truth with respect to an institutional context
in way that respects these two principles.
5.1 Truth in an institutional context
We formalize the notion of truth w.r.t. to a certain institutional
context with the operator [x]. A formula [x]ϕ is read “within the
institutional context x, it is the case that ϕ”. Here we suppose
that “within the institutional context x it is the case that ϕ” if and
only if “for every set of agents C, the agents in C accept that ϕ
while functioning as group members in the institutional context x”.
Formally, for x ∈ INST :
[x]ϕ
def
=
∧
C∈2AGT⋆
[C:x]ϕ
It is straightforward to prove that [x] are normal modal operators.
Given the previous analysis, a fact is true w.r.t. an institutional con-
text if and only if such fact is accepted by all the agents while they
function as group members (hence the performativity and the re-
flexivity principles are maintained). Moreover, following Theorem
1, this group acceptance is the object of a common belief.
At this point, it might be objected that there are facts which are
true in an institutional context but only “special” group members
in the institution are aware of them. For instance, there are laws in
every country which known only by the specialists of the domain
(lawyers, judges, members of the parliament, etc.). Aren’t these
facts true notwithstanding that many group members are not aware
of them?
In order to resist to this objection recall that, at this stage, our
model applies to the basic informal institutions of a society. Rela-
tive to this restriction, the proposed assumption is justified because,
w.r.t. these institutions, there is no other special institutional con-
texts in which the agents have the power to create and eliminate in-
stitutional facts characterizing the institution itself (i.e. nobody has
the power to change the rules for promising). It is in fact peculiar of
legal (formal) institutions to create such a specialized meta-context
in which the agents have special powers to interpret and modify the
institution itself. Given the aims of this paper, we leave this special
case for future work.
Finally, the following abbreviation is defined:
[Univ ]ϕ
def
=
∧
x∈INST
[x]ϕ
which stands for “ϕ is universally accepted as true”.
5.2 Contextual conditionals
From the concept of truth with respect to an institutional context
a notion of contextual conditional can be defined. A contextual
conditional is a material implication of the form ϕ → ψ in the
scope of an operator [x]. A contextual conditional is a local one,
that is, a conditional that is not universally valid while it is accepted
by the group members in a specific institutional context. More pre-
cisely, we exclude the situation in which [Univ ] (ϕ→ ψ) is true.
EXAMPLE 6. Let consider the institutional context of gestural lan-
guage. There exists a contextual conditional in this language ac-
cording to which, the nodding gesture “counts as” an endorsement
of what the speaker is suggesting. This conditional is formally ex-
pressed by the construction [gesture] (nodding → yes). It is clear
that this kind of conditional is not universally valid (e.g. in a dif-
ferent cultural context the same gesture may express exactly the
opposite fact). Thus, ¬ [Univ ] (nodding → yes) holds.
More generally, for every x ∈ INST we define the following
abbreviation:
ϕ
x
⊲ ψ
def
= [x] (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬ [Univ ] (ϕ→ ψ)
ϕ
x
⊲ ψ stands for “in the institutional context x, if ϕ then ψ”.
Although space restrictions prevent from presenting and discussing
all relevant properties of our construction ϕ
x
⊲ ψ, it is interesting
to note that ϕ
x
⊲ ψ satisfies some intuitive properties of count-as
conditionals as isolated in [17].
THEOREM. For every x ∈ INST :
From ⊢AL (ϕ2 ↔ ϕ3) infer ⊢AL (ϕ1 x⊲ ϕ2 ↔ ϕ1 x⊲ ϕ3)(2)
From ⊢AL (ϕ1 ↔ ϕ3) infer ⊢AL (ϕ1 x⊲ ϕ2 ↔ ϕ3 x⊲ ϕ2)(3)
⊢AL (ϕ1
x
⊲ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ1
x
⊲ ϕ3)→ (ϕ1
x
⊲ (ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3))(4)
⊢AL (ϕ1
x
⊲ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3
x
⊲ ϕ2)→ ((ϕ1 ∨ ϕ3)
x
⊲ ϕ2)(5)
⊢AL (ϕ1
x
⊲ ϕ2 ∧ (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
x
⊲ ϕ3)→ (ϕ1
x
⊲ ϕ3)(6)
PROOF. We only provide a proof of Theorem 6 as an example.
This theorem expresses a property of cumulative transitivity (cut).
The other theorems and rules of inference can be proved straight-
forwardly by definition of ϕ
x
⊲ ψ) and the axioms and rules of in-
ference ofAL. ϕ1
x
⊲ ϕ2∧(ϕ1∧ϕ2)
x
⊲ ϕ3 implies [x] (ϕ1 → ϕ2)
and [x] ((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)→ ϕ3) which in turn imply [x] (ϕ1 → ϕ3) (by
the fact that [x] is normal. Moreover, ϕ1
x
⊲ ϕ2 ∧ (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
x
⊲
ϕ3 implies ¬ [Univ ] ((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) → ϕ3) which is equivalent to
¬ [Univ ] (¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬ϕ2 ∨ ϕ3). It is straightforward to prove that
operator [Univ ] is also a normal modal operator (space restrictions
prevent from giving the proof here). Therefore, ¬ [Univ ] (¬ϕ1 ∨
¬ϕ2 ∨ ϕ3) implies ¬ [Univ ] (¬ϕ1 ∨ ϕ3) (by the fact that [Univ ]
is normal) which in turn is equivalent to ¬ [Univ ] (ϕ1 → ϕ3).
Moreover, we can easily show that our concept of contextual
conditional does not satisfy reflexivity, transitivity and weaken-
ing of the antecedent, that is, the following three formulas are not
valid: ϕ
x
⊲ ϕ, (ϕ1
x
⊲ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ2
x
⊲ ϕ3) → ϕ1
x
⊲ ϕ3, and
ϕ1
x
⊲ ϕ2 → (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3)
x
⊲ ϕ2. As discussed in section 6.2 our
notion of contextual conditional is similar to the notion of proper
classificatory rule given in [13]. 4
5.3 Normative facts
While contextual conditionals are useful to understand the notion
of institutional facts, they are not sufficient for a more precise char-
acterization. In fact, as noted in [26], institutional facts are always
connected to a deontic dimension that up to now is still missing.
In our perspective, a contextual conditional ϕ
x
⊲ ψ can be
adopted to represent an institutional fact if and only if the term ψ
in the contextual conditional is a fact to which a certain number of
obligations and permissions are associated within the institutional
context x. In this sense, ψ is an institutional fact with respect to the
institutional context x.
EXAMPLE 7.“Being eighteen years old counts as being of age” is
a constitutive rule accepted by a set of agents qua citizens in Italy
and “being of age” is an institutional fact with respect to this con-
text. Moreover, to such an institutional fact a certain number of
permissions and obligations are associated (e.g. in Italy if you are
of age you have the permission to vote and the obligation to fulfill
the military duties). In this sense the constitutive rule “being eigh-
teen years old counts as being of age” connects the institutional fact
“being of age” with the brute fact “being eighteen years old” which
is a fact intrinsically connected to certain normative facts.
In order to capture this core feature, our logic AL can be appro-
priately extended by introducing a violation atom V as in Ander-
son’s reduction of deontic logic to alethic logic [2] and in dynamic
deontic logic [22]. By means of this new formal construct we can
specify normative facts (i.e. what it is obligatory and permitted)
in a way that respect their being also a kind of attitude-depend
fact holding relative to certain attitudes and in a specific institu-
tional context. As far as obligations are concerned, we say that “ϕ
is something obligatory within the institutional context x” (noted
O(ϕ, x)) if and only if “¬ϕ → V is a contextual conditional in
the institutional context x” or, more specifically, “¬ϕ counts as a
violation within the institutional context x”. Formally:
O(ϕ, x)
def
= ¬ϕ
x
⊲ V .
As far as permission are concerned we say that “ϕ is something
permitted within the institutional context x” (noted P (ϕ, x)) if and
only if ¬ϕ is not obligatory within the institutional context x. For-
mally:
P (ϕ, x)
def
= ¬O(¬ϕ, x).
4We refer to [13] for interesting arguments concerning why proper
classificatory rules should not necessarily satisfy reflexivity, transi-
tivity and weakening of the antecedent.
Formulas of type O(ϕ, x) and P (ϕ, x) can be conceived as par-
ticular instances of so-called regulative rules, that is, rules which
specify the ideal behavior of agents in terms of permissions, obliga-
tions, and prohibitions. We refer to these rules as normative facts.5
EXAMPLE 8. The formula O(driveCar → ¬RightSide,UK ) is
a normative fact in the UK within whose context it is obligatory to
drive on the left side of the street ( i.e. “driving a car on the right
side of the street counts as violation in UK”).
Again, it is important to stress the fact that normative facts,
by being represented with a contextual conditional are attitude-
dependent facts and are intrinsically connected with the acceptance
of all the agents qua group members in a specific institutional con-
text.
5.4 Institutional facts and constitutive rules
We are now in the position to formalize what an institutional fact
is. Let 2LAL⋆ = 2LAL \ {∅} the set of non empty subsets of
LAL. From the previous construction ϕ
x
⊲ ψ it is straightforward
to come up with a formal characterization of the concept of such a
fact. Formally, for every x ∈ INST and ΣO , ΣP ∈ 2LAL⋆:
InstFact
ΣO,ΣP
x (ϕ)
def
=
∧
σ∈ΣO
O(ϕ→ σ, x) ∧
∧
σ′∈ΣP
P (ϕ ∧ σ′, x)
InstFact
ΣO,ΣP
x (ϕ) stands for “ϕ is an institutional fact within the
institutional context x characterized by the set of obligations ΣO
and the set of permissions ΣP ”.
EXAMPLE 9. The formula InstFact{military},{vote}Italy (toBeOfAge)
stands for “being of age is an institutional fact in the context of
Italy and is characterized by the permission to vote in the political
elections and the obligation to fulfill the military duties”.6
From the concept of institutional fact we can also formalize the
concept of constitutive rule. To this aim, we must make explicit the
fact that the term ψ in ϕ
x
⊲ ψ is an institutional fact to which a set
of obligations and a set of permissions are associated. Formally,
for every x ∈ INST and ΣO , ΣP ∈ 2LAL⋆:
ConstRule
ΣO,ΣP
x (ϕ,ψ)
def
= ϕ
x
⊲ ψ ∧ InstFactΣO,ΣPx (ψ)
ConstRule
ΣO,ΣP
x (ϕ,ψ) stands for “ϕ counts as ψ is a constitutive
rule of institution x where ψ is an institutional fact within the in-
stitutional context x characterized by the set of obligations ΣO and
the set of permissions ΣP ”.
EXAMPLE 10.The formula ConstRule{military},{vote}Italy (eighteen,
toBeOfAge) stands for “being eighteen years old counts as being
of age is a constitutive rule in the context of Italy and being of age
is an institutional fact characterized by the permission to vote in the
political elections and the obligation to fulfill the military duties”.
In this sense ConstRule{military},{vote}Italy (eighteen, toBeOfAge) is
a specific kind of contextual conditional in which the connec-
tion between the institutional fact toBeOfAge and the brute fact
eighteen is established. A number of normative facts consist-
ing in obligations and permissions pertain to the institutional fact
5The distinction between regulative rule and constitutive rule has
been emphasized by Searle [26] and then modelled in logic by sev-
eral authors. For an example see [3].
6A more precise formulation of this example needs a representation
of the right relation which is, however, beyond the scope of this
article. See [20] for more details.
toBeOfAge , namely O(toBeOfAge → military , Italy) and
P (toBeOfAge ∧ vote, Italy).
6. RELATED WORKS
6.1 Link between AL and the G logic
A logic of what is publicly grounded in a group has been intro-
duced in [11]: GCϕ means that “it is publicly grounded for group
C that ϕ is true”. When C is reduced to a singleton {i}, G{i} is
identified with the belief à la Hintikka [16]. We can show that it
can be viewed as an operator of group belief (in the Gilbert’s sense
[12] 7). In this view, group belief is rational (DGC ), public for ev-
ery subgroup (SR+ and SR−) and it has been formed by the joint
acceptance of all members (WR and CG). Its axiomatics is thus the
following one:
(DGC ) GCϕ→ ¬GC¬ϕ
(SR+) GCϕ→ GC′GCϕ,C′ ⊆ C
(SR−) ¬GCϕ→ GC′¬GCϕ,C′ ⊆ C
(WR) GCϕ→ GCGC′ϕ,C′ ⊆ C and ϕ objective.8
(CG) (∧
i∈C GCGiϕ)→ GCϕ
Notions of group belief and group acceptance seem to be very
close. Thus the idea of expressing the G operator in AL appears
intuitive becauseAL is more expressive, with the notion of context
lacking in theG logic. We show in the sequel thatAL can subsume
the G’s logic.
Contrary to our framework, G operator does not take into ac-
count various institutional contexts, what expresses that it considers
(implicitly) only one. Thus formally we have: GCϕ ≡ [C:xC ]ϕ,
where xC is the only institution wherebyC is concerned and where
x{i} ≡ λ.
We need both to examine and compare axiomatics. Axioms
4[C :x],[B:y] and 5[C :x],[B:y] are generalizations of the (SR+) and
(SR−) for contexts xC and xB instead of x and y. They rep-
resent the public nature of both notions. Axiom Inc[C :x],[B:x]
cannot be expressed in the grounding logic9. An axiom such as:
GCϕ → GBϕ, would be too strong because we consider that be-
lief of a subgroup is not related to the uppergroup beliefs (and in
particular group belief is totally independent of individual group
members beliefs).
Some axioms lack inAL to represent theG operators. In partic-
ular the axiom D[i:λ] should be generalized to [C:xC ] representing
that agents in C are de facto functioning as group members in the
context xC . Moreover axioms (WR) and (CG) express that a group
belief is established by a consensus of expressed opinion. They
do not have a counterpart in the AL logic, because we are only
concerned here by properties of acceptance (not by its formation).
(WR) and (CG) could be translated directly.
These three additional axioms are due to the features of the par-
ticular context xC : they represent the strong link existing between
xC and C. We can note that theorem 1 is also a theorem of the
grounding logic. In the sequel, we explore interactions between
GC defined as [C:xC ] and general acceptance [C:x], which pro-
duces mixed theorems.
7The proof is based on common features shared by both notions.
They are public, commonly believed when established and formed
by consensus (i.e. by acceptance of every member).
8An objective formula is a formula that is not equivalent to a for-
mula under the scope of Gi operator, for each member i of C. This
restriction is due to the fact that, by asserting proposition ϕ, an
agent expresses that he believes ϕ and thus this belief is automati-
cally grounded for the group thank to public actions hypotheses.
9Except under his tautological and uninformative form where B =
C.
As ¬ [C:x]⊥ → ¬ [B:x]⊥ (with B ⊆ C) is a theorem of
AL (the proof can be easily built from Inc[C :x],[B:x]), we have:
¬ [C:xC ]⊥ → ¬ [B:xC ]⊥, with B ⊆ C, which means that every
agent in subsets of C are also functioning as group members in the
context xC .
Moreover, as ¬ [C:xC ]⊥ is valid, Axiom Inc[C :x],[B:x] is re-
duced to the following theorem: [C:xC ]ϕ→ [B:xC ]ϕ, with B ⊆
C. Thus if ϕ is a belief of the group C, every subgroup accept it
in the context of xC ; there is a group acceptance on what is col-
lectively believed. For example, if it is collectively believed by the
activists that the aim of Greenpeace is to protect the Earth then in
the context of Greenpeace every subgroup must accept it. This does
not implies anything about subgroup and individual beliefs.
From previous theorem, we can also prove that: [C:xC ]ϕ →
[C:xC ] [B:xC ]ϕ, with B ⊆ C. This theorem extends the previous
one: if ϕ is collectively believed, every subgroup accept it in the
context xC (by former theorem), but this acceptance is also collec-
tively believed. This theorem is in fact quite close to axiom (WR)
in the grounding logic.
6.2 Related works on normative systems
Because of interesting formal similarities and given the space re-
strictions, we will just compare AL with [13] in which a modal
logic for the formalization of count-as assertions and the specifica-
tion of normative systems has been proposed. This logic is based
on a set of modal operators [x]∗ where the index x is in a set of
indexes C0.10 An index x is supposed to denote a certain institu-
tional context (or normative system). Operators [x]∗ are similar to
our operators [x] defined in Section 5.1. A formula [x]∗ ϕ approx-
imately stands for “in the institutional context/normative system x
it is the case that ϕ”. An operator [u]∗ is also used for denoting
facts which universally hold. The set C = C0 ∪ {u} is given
by adding index u to the set of indexes C0. Differently from our
logic where the contextual operator [x] is built on the notion of
group acceptance, in Grossi’s logic the contextual operator [x]∗
is given as a primitive operator. Operators [x]∗ and [u]∗ are ex-
ploited in Grossi’s logic to define contextual conditionals called
proper classificatory rules noted by ϕ ⇒cl+i ψ which is an abbre-
viation of [x]∗ (ϕ → ψ) ∧ ¬ [u]∗ (ϕ → ψ) and is meant to stand
for “ϕ counts as ψ in the normative system x”. The construction
ϕ ⇒cl+i ψ is similar to our ϕ
x
⊲ ψ.11 Operator [u]∗ is S5 and the
logic is supposed to satisfy the following additional principles. For
any x, y ∈ C:
1. [x]∗ ϕ→ [y]∗ [x]∗ ϕ 3. [u]∗ ϕ→ [x]∗ ϕ
2. ¬ [x]∗ ϕ→ [y]∗ ¬ [x]∗ ϕ 4. [u]∗ ϕ→ ϕ
According to the both principles 1. and 2., truth and falsehood in
institutional contexts/normative systems are absolute because they
remain invariant even if evaluated from another institutional con-
text/normative system. This means that every normative system
y has full access to all facts which are true in a different norma-
tive system x. These two principles are in our view criticizable
because they rely on the very counter-intuitive assumption that all
facts true in an institutional context are public to all other insti-
tutional contexts. But, what does it mean that a fact is known
10Here we use the notation [x]∗ in order to distinguish Grossi’s op-
erators from our operators [x].
11The author distinguishes proper classificatory rules from mere
classificatory rules and constitutive rules. Differently from clas-
sificatory rules, proper classificatory rules are rules which would
not hold without the normative system/institution stating them. In
[14] a further distinction between classificatory rules and constitu-
tive rules is given.
by an institution? Our aim here is to show that such an assump-
tion can be disambiguated in our logical framework. The relevant
question is: under what additional assumptions formulas [x]ϕ →
[y] [x]ϕ and ¬ [x]ϕ → [y]¬ [x]ϕ can be inferred in our logic?
On the one hand, it is easy to prove that the principles given in
Section 3.3 are not sufficient to infer such formulas. Indeed, for-
mulas [x]ϕ ∧ ¬ [y] [x]ϕ and ¬ [x]ϕ ∧ ¬ [y]¬ [x]ϕ are satisfiable
in AL. On the other hand, it is straightforward to show that: if
Axioms 4[C :x],[B:y] and 5[C :x],[B:y] are weakened by supposing
that they also hold forB * C, then formulas [x]ϕ→ [y] [x]ϕ and
¬ [x]ϕ→ [y]¬ [x]ϕ can be inferred. This means that in our logic
Grossi’s properties can be derived under the assumption that, given
two arbitrary sets of agents B and C, agents in B has access to all
facts that agents in C accept (do not accept), while functioning as
group members in a certain institutional context x. That is, given
an arbitrary set of agentsC, if agents inC accept that ϕwhile func-
tioning as a group members in the institutional context x then this
fact is public in such a way that all other agents outside C accept
that agents in C accept that ϕ while functioning as group members
in the institutional context x.
Concerning the principle 4., it says that: if ϕ universally holds
then ϕ is true. This principle is also criticizable in our opinion. For
instance, during the 7th-6th century BC people believed that the
earth was flat. But it has never been the case that earth was/is/will
be flat.
More generally, if we suppose that: Axioms 4[C :x],[B:y] and
5[C :x],[B:y] studied in Section 3.3 are also valid for B * C; the T
axiom is valid for [Univ ] operator (in a similar way of the previous
principle 4.); and the following translations of Grossi’s operators
[x]∗ and [u]∗ into our logic AL are given
• tr([x]∗ ϕ) = [x]ϕ
• tr([u]∗ ϕ) = [Univ ]ϕ,
we can prove that the translations into AL of all Grossi’s axioms
are AL theorems. This is shown by the following theorem.
THEOREM. Suppose that: i) [Univ ]ϕ → ϕ is valid, and that
for every C:x,B:y ∈ ∆, ii) [C:x]ϕ → [B:y] [C:x]ϕ and iii)
¬ [C:x]ϕ→ [B:y]¬ [C:x]ϕ are valid inAL. Thus, the following
properties can be inferred in AL:
• [x]ϕ→ [y] [x]ϕ
• ¬ [x]ϕ→ [y]¬ [x]ϕ
• [Univ ]ϕ→ [x]ϕ
• [Univ ] satisfies all Axioms and rules of inference of the sys-
tem S5
PROOF. We only provide a proof of the last item of the theorem.
The other items can be proved in a similar way. First of all [Univ ]
is a normal modal operator by definition as a conjunction of nor-
mal modal operators [x]. We have property T[Univ] by Hypothe-
sis i). We only need to prove that 4[Univ] and 5[Univ] can be in-
ferred from the hypotheses. From Hypothesis ii) we can deduce
that [C:x]ϕ →
∧
B:y∈∆ [B:y] [C:x]ϕ which is equivalent (by
definition of [Univ ]ϕ) to [C:x]ϕ → [Univ ] [C:x]ϕ, which en-
tails
∧
C:x∈∆ [C:x]ϕ→
∧
C:x∈∆ [Univ ] [C:x]ϕ, which is equiv-
alent to [Univ ]ϕ → [Univ ] [Univ ]ϕ (i.e. 4[Univ]). 5[Univ] (i.e.
¬ [Univ ]ϕ → [Univ ]¬ [Univ ]ϕ) can be inferred from Hypothe-
sis iii) in a similar way.
7. CONCLUSION
Let’s take stock. We have started the paper by raising the chal-
lenge of autonomy at the level of MASs, so that they will be able to
bind themselves in ways that further the achievement of collective
goods in dynamic and uncertain environments as human societies
do.
As a first step to meet this challenge, we have proposed the AL
logic in which the agents’ attitudes qua group members can be an-
alyzed. Given the properties of a demystified notion of group ac-
ceptance in an institutional context, we have provided an analysis
of the kind of attitude-dependent facts typical of institutions. In
particular, we have introduced a notion of obligation and permis-
sion with respect to an institutional context (i.e. so-called normative
facts). Then, we have defined institutional facts. In our perspective
an institutional fact within the institutional context x is a fact to
which a number of obligations and permissions are (contextually)
associated. Finally, we have formalized the concept of constitutive
rule, that is, a rule which is responsible for the connection between
an institutional fact and a brute physical fact. In our view, a con-
stitutive rule is a rule of type “ϕ counts as ψ in the institutional
context x” where ψ denotes an institutional fact within the insti-
tutional context x. While such rules are usually defined from the
external perspective of a normative system or institution, we have,
once again, anchored these rules in the agents’ attitudes.
Although the present model is focused on the neglected layer of
informal institutions, it still lacks sufficient expressiveness to repre-
sent the phenomenon of “institutionalized power” [17] which is, of
course, crucial also within this kind of institutions. In order to cope
with limitation, in future work, we will expand AL with Proposi-
tional Dynamic Logic (PDL) in order to be able to talk about ac-
tions within our language. Moreover, a first kind of dynamics will
be studied in which agents, qua group members in specific institu-
tional contexts, will be able to create new institutional facts. Given
the way we have modeled such facts, the agents will update and
revise their own deontic commitments accordingly.
This extension will further give the opportunity for a foundation
of artificial legal institutions and for their connections with infor-
mal ones. In fact the “basic norm” [18], i.e. the basic informal
institution that provides the validity of legal systems, will be repre-
sented on the model of the other informal institutions. Representing
the “basic norm” is in fact the crucial step for making it possible
for a MAS to create and maintain by itself a legal system that is
acknowledged as valid from the agents themselves.
The long term project is then to provide a three-layered model in
which legal institutions, social institutions, and the socio-cognitive
relations between the agents dynamically interact in order to enable
institutional change and adaptation.
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